

DDCI

NSPG Meeting on Central America

29 June 1984

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Please return to SA/DCI/IA

~~SECRET~~

28 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: SA/DCI/IA

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on Central America, 29 June 1984

1. You are scheduled to attend an NSPG meeting on Central America at 11:00 in the White House Situation Room. This will be a principal plus one affair; Dewey will be accompanying you.

2. There will be no papers provided for this meeting. As I understand it, the session is intended solely to permit Ambassador Shlaudeman to brief on his talks with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco of Nicaragua.

3. At TAB A you will find a State cable that reports on Commandante Borge's expectations of these meetings as expressed to a local audience in Managua on 23 June. At TAB B you find another State cable that briefly alludes (p.2) to Shlaudeman's reassurances to Duarte concerning his now concluded meetings with Tinoco. [REDACTED]

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4. In short, we don't have much information to provide you in advance as to what Shlaudeman is going to be telling you.

5. If there is anything else I can do to help you prepare for this meeting, please call. ¹

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 INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 3421

EO 12356: DECL: 6/25/90
 TAGS: PREL NU
 SUBJECT: BORGE ON SHLAUDEMAN-TINOCO TALKS

REF: (A) FBIS CHIVA CHIVA PN 240315Z JUN 84
 (B) FBIS CHIVA CHIVA PN 242053Z JUN 84

1. (C) COMANDANTE TOMAS BORGE IN A SPEECH JUNE 23 REPEATED FSLN SKEPTICISM REGARDING U.S. MOTIVES FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE SHLAUDEMAN-TINOCO TALKS. THE CONVERSATIONS THEMSELVES, HE SAID, WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAKING CLEAR WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN U.S. POLICY OR WHETHER U.S. WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IS "ONLY A PUBLICITY STUNT TO WIN VOTES". SPEAKING TO A LOCAL AUDIENCE IN MANAGUA, BORGE SAID THAT "(THE FSLN) HAS INSISTED ON A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. AND WILL DO AS MUCH AS WE CAN TO AVOID A FAILURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS." ACCORDING TO A BARRICADA REPORT ON THE SPEECH, BORGE SAID FURTHER, HOWEVER, THAT MANY U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND MEDIA SPOKESMEN HAD ALREADY SAID THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED OUT OF THE SHULTZ-ORTEGA MEETING DO NOT MEAN ANY CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY. "WE WILL NOT BE THE ONES TO CREATE DOUBT AND SUSPICION" ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS, HE ADDED, BUT RATHER.

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oh no ! not us !

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~~WOULD LET U.S. POLITICANS AND MEDIA DO IT THEMSELVES.~~
BORGE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LANGUAGE CHANGED SLIGHTLY AFTER HIS MAY 9 SPEECH ON U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. BUT, HE ADDED, ONLY THE LANGUAGE WAS MODERATED--THE POLICY REMAINS THE SAME.

2.(C) THE PARAPHRASED, EXCERPTED VERSION OF BORGE'S SPEECH WHICH APPEARED IN BARRICADA APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN EDITED TO MAKE HIS REMARKS SEEM SOMEWHAT MORE DUBIOUS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS THAN EVEN HIS ORIGINAL TEXT. COMPARING THE BARRICADA VERSION WITH THE FBIS TEXT (REFTEL), WE NOTE THAT THE FORMER OMITTED BORGE'S REMARK THAT "THE ANSWER WE WERE EXPECTING (I.E., ON U.S. WILLINGNESS TO HOLD A DIALOGUE) CAME RECENTLY WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ'S VISIT. WE HAD SOME FAVORABLE SIGNS." FURTHER, WHILE IN THE ORIGINAL BORGE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN "A CONSIDERABLE CHANGE" IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WORDS IN THE MAY 9 SPEECH. BARRICADA SAYS THERE WAS ONLY A SLIGHT CHANGE (...CAMBIO UN POCO).

3.(C) COMMENT. THE FSLN HAS SOUGHT TO REDUCE PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS HERE OF SUCCESS IN THE TALKS TO NEL. THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT ACHIEVED THAT GOAL.
GAMBLE

END OF MESSAGE

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*here, schmore.**The message is intended
for abroad - particularly the US*

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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHL/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6688
INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE
BT
EZ1:
S E C R E T SAN SALVADOR 07361
EXDIS
FLWG REPEAT SENT ACTION SAN SALVADOR 6/25/84 QUOTE:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 185819
EZ2:
EXDIS
E.O. 12056: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.), ES
SUBJECT: AME. SHLAUDEMAN'S VISIT TO EL SALVADOR,
JUNE 20-21
1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE EDIT AS NECESSARY AND RETRANSMIT IMMEDIATE
ACTION TO DEPARTMENT, INFO CONTADORA COLLECTIVE.
3. SUMMARY: DURING THE COURSE OF THE VISIT, SHLAUDEMAN
MET WITH DUARTE, MINPRESIDENT REY PRENDES, MOD VIDES
CASANOVA, FCNMIN TENORIO AND PLANNING MIN CHAVEZ MENA.
SHLAUDEMAN EXPLAINED PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO BRIEF ON
THE CONTEMPLATED TALKS WITH THE GRN AND TO OFFER OUR
VIEWS ON CONTADORA DRAFT. DUARTE WAS PRINCIPALLY
CONCERNED WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. NEITHER HE NOR OTHER
GOES CONTACTS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHAVEZ MENA, WERE
CONVERSANT WITH THE CONTADORA DRAFT. DUARTE REJECTED THE
CONTADORA ATTEMPT TO SET A DEADLINE FOR A RESPONSE AND
PROPOSED A FOUR-STEP PROCEDURE ENTAILING TECHNICAL
CONSULTATIONS BEFORE RESPONDING. ON HONDURAS/SALVADOR
BORDER ISSUE AND MILITARY COOPERATION, DUARTE PROPOSED
TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO PROCEED AND AN OVERALL
RATHER THAN A PIECEMEAL APPROACH. HE ALSO SUGGESTED WAYS
TO INCREASE MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE DISPUTED BORDER
AREAS. VIDES CASANOVA THOUGHT DUARTE WAS OFF ON THE
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5. DUARTE OPENED THE MEETING WITH A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS HE FACES. THE PRESENTATION WAS ESSENTIALLY A PLEA FOR ACCELERATED DISBURSMENT OF U.S. AID IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS PRESSING PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE NEW GOES.

7. CONTADORA DRAFT: SHLAUDEMAN EXPLAINED WE HAD REVIEWED THE DOCUMENT AND WERE PROVIDING THE GOES A NON-PAPER WITH OUR DETAILED THOUGHTS. (DUARTE WAS SURPRISED THAT WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED THE COPY OF THE DRAFT THAT HE HAD TOLD TENORIO TO GIVE US.) SHLAUDEMAN SAID WE FOUND THE DRAFT A STEP FORWARD, ALTHOUGH WITH SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE SECURITY AND VERIFICATION AREAS. SHLAUDEMAN ASKED ABOUT THE GOES RESPONSE, NOTING THAT MORALES PAUL SAID IN NEW YORK THAT THE CONTADORA GROUP EXPECTED THE CENTRAL AMERICAN RESPONSE BETWEEN JULY 1 AND 15. DUARTE, WHO CONCEDED THAT HE HAD NOT READ THE DOCUMENT, SAID HE HAD REJECTED A REQUEST BY THE CONTADORA COMINS TO REPLY BY A SET DATE. HE TOLD THEM HIS NEW GOVERNMENT WAS NOT YET IN A POSITION TO TAKE ON SUCH A DELICATE TASK WITHOUT CAREFUL ANALYSIS. DUARTE PROPOSED A FOUR-STEP PROCEDURE TO

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QUARTE SAID THAT TENORIO WOULD BE THE FORMAL NEGOTIATOR BUT THAT REY FRENDES WOULD BE THE INFORMAL NEGOTIATOR ON THE MAJOR ISSUES.

9. HONDURAS/SALVADOR BORDER ISSUES AND MILITARY COOPERATION: SHLAUDEMAN SAID HE HAD RAISED THE BORDER QUESTION WITH THE HONDURANS WHO ARE READY TO TALK WITH THE NEW GOES. SHLAUDEMAN SAID HE SEE POSITIVE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE BORDER QUESTION AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS TO IMPROVE GOES/GCH MILITARY COOPERATION. DUARTE SAID HE HAD PROPOSED TO SUAZO THAT TENOKIO VISIT HONDURAS WEEK OF JUNE 25. THE GOES IS ALSO READY TO SEND A TECHNICAL TEAM TO TEGULIGALPA TO TALK AND WOULD WELCOME A SIMILAR VISIT BY THE HONDURANS. THE PROBLEM IS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE OVERALL STRATEGIES BUT NO DIRECT UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO PROCEED. IF SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED, A GCH/GOES MEETING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL COULD ESTABLISH THE SYSTEM WHEREBY DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

11. THE GRN AND THE INSURGENCY: BLEAKELY RAISED THE ISSUE OF DEMONSTRATING PUBLICLY GRN INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR. HE SUGGESTED A DISPLAY OF WEAPONRY OF SOVIET-BLOC ORIGIN CAPTURED IN EL SALVADOR. DUARTE LIKED THE IDEA -- AND CALLED THE DEFENSE MINISTRY TO ENDORSE IT -- BUT UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPTURING ARMS ACTUALLY

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THIS WITH THE MILITARY BUT SAID THE GOES NEEDED OUTSIDE
TECHNICAL SUPPORT. HE SUGGESTED WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S.
COULD HELP.

12. MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE: IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE MOD, SHLAUDERMAN PROVIDED VIDES CASANOVA WITH THE SAME BRIEFING ON U.S.-NICARAGUAN TALKS AND THE CONTADORA DRAFT. THE GENERAL HAD NOT SEEN THE LATTER BUT INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE PREPARATION OF THE GOES RESPONSE.

13. THE MOD COMMENTED ON THE POSITIVE POLITICAL PROGRESS MADE IN RECENT MONTHS AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY THE ARMED FORCES. THEY HAD MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO AVOID INTERNAL DIVISION DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF. DUARTE'S INAUGURAL SPEECH WAS VERY HELPFUL IN MEETING THE ARMED FORCES' CONCERNS ABOUT HIS PRESIDENCY, AS WERE HIS MARATHON MEETINGS WITH THE COMMANDERS AND HIS VISITS TO THE CUARTELS. THESE WERE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THAT SHOULD HELP STRENGTHEN DUARTE'S POSITION OVER THE NEXT TWO-THREE MONTHS.

14. THE MILITARY SITUATION IS RELATIVELY CALM BUT THE GUERRILLAS ARE ACTIVELY RECRUITING TO RAISE FORCE LEVELS FROM 9,000 TO 14,000, PERHAPS IN PREPARATION FOR A SEPTEMBER OFFENSIVE. ARMED FORCES MORALE REMAINS HIGH, HOWEVER, AND VIDAS WAS CONFIDENT THEY CAN DEAL WITH SUCH AN OFFENSIVE.

15. IN VIDES' VIEW, THE MAJOR CHALLENGES FACING DUARTE ARE ECONOMIC, THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFICIT AND GROWING WAGE DEMANDS. THE MCD HAD ALREADY TAKEN SERIOUS BUDGET CUTS. ON ANOTHER FRONT, THE MILITARY ARE IMPROVING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH. REFORMS ARE UNDER WAY.

INCLUDING A NEW ROLE FOR THE TREASURY POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS INDOCTRINATION FOR SECURITY FORCES. VIDES WAS CONCERNED THAT OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN THE CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIARY MIGHT PRODUCE OBSTACLES FOR DUARTE, BUT HOPED THESE COULD BE NEGOTIATED SATISFACTORILY.

16. MEETING WITH FONMIN TENORIO: SHLAUDEMAN MET BRIEFLY WITH TENORIO EVENING OF JUNE 20. SHLAUDEMAN REVIEWED HIS MEETINGS IN GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS AND UNDERSCORED THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED APPROACH AMONG THE CORE FOUR. HE ALSO BRIEFED TENORIO ON HIS MEETING WITH DUARTE.

SHLAUDERMAN RECOGNIZED THAT THE NEW GOES TEAM HAD YET TO ANALYZE THE CONTADORA DRAFT. HE ASSURED TENORIO OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH HIM ON ANY FURTHER CONSULTATIONS HE MIGHT WANT. HE NOTED ANDRADE'S INTEREST IN CORE FOUR TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT LEAVING THE INITIATIVE TO THE NICARAGUANS. THE GRN SOUGHT A QUICK BUT GENERAL TREATY TO PROTECT ITS OWN INTERESTS, NOT THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS.

17. MEETING WITH FIDEL CHAVEZ: AT BREAKFAST SESSION JUNE 21, CHAVEZ SAID HE HAS SEEN THE CONTADORA DRAFT AND ASSERTED THAT CUARTE HAD ASKED FOR HIS GUIDANCE BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHLAUDAMAN. (NOTE: ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, CUARTE HAS FORMED AN INFORMAL "COMMISSION" CONSISTING OF CHAVEZ, REY FREADES AND TENORIO TO PREPARE THE SALVADORAN RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.) FIDEL SAID THE DRAFT BROKE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONTADORA FOUR AND THE CENTRAL

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AMERICANS THAT THE CONTADORA GROUP WOULD NOT DRAFT A TREATY BUT WOULD LIMIT ITSELF TO ORGANIZING AND INTEGRATING THE MATERIAL PROVIDED BY THE WORKING COMMISSION. HE SAW THE HAND OF THE MEXICANS IN THE DRAFT AND ARGUED THAT IT WORKED AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS. IT WAS SUPERFICIALLY APPEALING TO THOSE WHO KNEW LITTLE OF THE SITUATION AND TO THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO LIMIT THE U.S. ROLE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SUCH AS THE NAM. HE CONTENDED THAT THE PROTOCOL TO THE DRAFT FAVORED THE CUBANS.

18. SHLAUDEMAN AGREED, BUT SAID THE DRAFT HAD SOME INTERESTING POINTS; FOR INSTANCE, THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROVISIONS WOULD GIVE THE GRN PROBLEMS. THE GRN HAD ALREADY APPROACHED THE GUATEMALANS TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THOSE PROVISIONS. FIDEL ASSERTED THAT THE DRAFT ALSO OFFERED THE CONTADORA GROUP, REALIZING THAT IT COULD NOT SOLVE THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PROBLEM, A WAY TO BACK OFF AND LEAVE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICANS. HE RECOUNTED A CONVERSATION ON THE NIGHT OF DUARTE'S INAUGURAL WITH COLOMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LLOREDA IN WHICH THE LATTER EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT CONTADORA WAS AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK AND COULD NOT SUCCEED.

19. FIDEL ARGUED AGAINST ANY FURTHER MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETINGS AT THIS TIME. HE PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT THE CORE FOUR, AFTER CLOSE BUT QUIET CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S., TABLE A REVISED VERSION OF THE EARLIER TREATY PROPOSED BY EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA. HE THOUGHT GUATEMALA WOULD GO ALONG. BOTH DOCUMENTS COULD THEN BE DISCUSSED BY THE NINE AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL. IT COULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE UN TO DEMONSTRATE THE CENTRAL AMERICANS' RESPONSIVENESS TO THE CONTADORA PROPOSAL. SHLAUDEMAN AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD STRATEGY WHICH WOULD GIVE THE CORE FOUR THE INITIATIVE. SHLAUDEMAN UNDERTOOK TO FOLLOW UP WITH ANDRADE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOG'S IDEA OF TECHNICAL-LEVEL MEETINGS OF THE CORE FOUR. (SEPTEL.)

20. GOES/FMLN DIALOGUE: FIDEL REFERRED TO THE UNGO LETTER TO DUARTE PROPOSING DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GOES AND THE FDR/FMLN WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS OR AGENDA. HE ALSO SAID THAT A COSTA RICAN MESSENGER FROM FMLN/FDR HAD APPROACHED DUARTE THROUGH THE ARCHBISHOP PROPOSING SECRET MEETINGS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE UNIDENTIFIED COSTA RICAN PROPOSED A GOES DELEGATION OF TWO-THREE PERSONS AND SUGGESTED THAT FIDEL OR PABLO MAURICIO ALVERGUE SERVE AS THE COORDINATOR FOR SUCH CONTACTS, AN IDEA THAT UNDERSTANDABLY MADE FIDEL NERVOUS. DUARTE HAD PUT OFF A RESPONSE TO THE UNGO LETTER AND THE COSTA RICAN CONTACT SAYING IT WAS TOO EARLY IN HIS GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS THE DIALOGUE QUESTION. FIDEL SPECULATED THAT THESE INITIATIVES MIGHT REFLECT A SENSE OF WEAKNESS ON THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS CONSTITUTING TACTICAL MOVES.

21. FIDEL'S NATIONAL PLAN: CHAVEZ ASSERTED THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE IN EL SALVADOR IN THE WAKE OF THE INAUGURATION WAS MORE UPBEAT THAN ACTUAL CONDITIONS WARRANTED. HE IS DRAFTING ON HIS OWN A NATIONAL PLAN COVERING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL MATTERS. HE PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN NSC TO DEVELOP WITHIN THE MILITARY A GREATER POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE WAR, AS WELL AS A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL. HE WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN THE HUMAN

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22. OTHER EXCHANGES: SHLAUDERMAN HAD BRIEF
NON-SUBSTANTIVE SESSION WITH PCA LEADER CHACHI GUERRERO
(LIKELY SUPREME COURT PRESIDENT). GUERRERO ASSERTED THAT
THE PCN, SAVED FROM OBLIVION BY THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC
RULE, WOULD SERVE AS A LOYAL OPPOSITION AND MODERATING
FORCE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT THE PCN WOULD WORK TO
ENSURE AGAINST THE RETURN OF A PERSONALISTIC PRESIDENCY
IN EL SALVADOR. SHULTZ UNQUOTE BLEAKLEY

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